

PEACE-BUILDING: THEORETICAL AND CONCRETE PERSPECTIVES

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In a world where war is everybody's tragedy and everybody's nightmare, diplomacy is everybody's business. —Lord Strang¹

This paper presents a comprehensive review of the conflict resolution and peace-building literature focused on the issues involved in assessing the impact of peacemaking and peace-building through people-to-people contact. Findings reveal that we are still in the beginning stages of establishing frameworks for the resolution of wars and the building of peace and that there continues to be academic and political contestation over the definition of peace and peace-building. At the same time, this review identifies significant research progress in creating useful conceptual distinctions among the various modalities for peace, in establishing definitions that are both explanatory and remedial, and in recognizing the need for multi-faceted approaches to peacemaking and peace-building. Likewise, the literature indicates a growing understanding of the various forms of people-to-people contact, their impact, their possibilities, and their limitations. Attempts are made to reconcile the tensions between structural and social-psychological approaches, and similarly, the contradictions between conflict resolution and social justice. Finally, directions for future research that address the impact, the effectiveness, and the possibilities for creating an infrastructure for a sustainable just peace.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, with the creation of the UN collective security system, interstate wars have become more rare.² Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallensteen suggest that for the period 1989–2003, which marked the end of the Cold War, there have been only seven interstate armed conflicts, two of which continued to be active through 2003:

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the U.S.-led coalition and the insurgents and operatives of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the India–Pakistan war over Kashmir. In contrast, during this same period there were 116 conflicts active in 78 countries.³ Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr note that as of early 2005, 19 of the 20 “major armed conflicts” were intrastate, and six countries could be denoted as having “emerging [intrastate] wars.”⁴

While Robert L. Rothstein notes that the end of the Cold War had contradictory effects pushing some to armed conflicts and others towards peace, it is generally agreed that the amount of intrastate conflicts rose sharply at the end of the Cold War.⁵ Since 1990, more than one-third of the world’s countries have been directly affected by serious societal warfare and nearly two-thirds of these states experienced armed conflicts during this period for seven or more years.⁶ While there is some debate among scholars of conflict data with regards to whether or not the amount of conflicts around the world have diminished in the last few years, two trends have been clear and have been generally agreed upon in the conflict resolution literature. First, most wars today are the intrastate type rather than the more traditional interstate wars. Second, societal wars, as many argue, are incredibly resistant and tend to defy resolution.⁷

These contemporary conflicts or “new wars” as defined by Mary Kaldor have also been defined as “protracted social conflicts,” “deep-rooted conflicts,” and “intractable conflicts.”⁸ Edward E. Azar defines protracted social conflicts as “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation.” He notes that these conflicts are often between communal groups and the *state*; often in states in which one ethnic or religious group controls the “machinery of the state” and uses it to discriminate against other groups.⁹ John W. Burton uses the term “deep-rooted conflict” to denote conflicts based on human needs that are non-negotiable such as identity, recognition, participation, and security, and argues that identity groups will seek almost *any* means to fulfill their needs. Moreover, he argues that such conflicts cannot be suppressed, contained, or resolved for more than a short period through coerced or even negotiated settlements.¹⁰ Preferring the term “intractable conflicts,” Benjamin Gidron, Stanley N. Katz, and Yeheskel Hasenfeld argue that the characteristics of these conflicts include being protracted, continual, violent, perceived as irreconcilable, zero-sum, central to the lives of the identity

groups involved, and total in that it is about the needs and values essential for the conflicting groups' survival.¹¹ In the literature, the terminology and the conception of protracted conflicts, deep-rooted conflicts, and intractable conflicts are all used and compatible. Moreover, these conflicts are also often called "ethnic conflicts" given that communal groups are the focus, group rights are at issue, and furthermore, it speaks to the way the conflict has been interpreted by the majority of the people involved.¹² Nonetheless, given that there is nothing intrinsically "ethnic" in these conflicts, Mats Friberg and John Paul Lederach suggest calling them "identity conflicts," in which it has been argued that it is critical to address the fundamental needs of the population (e.g., security, recognition, access), not least of which is that peace processes can take time and all it takes is a few extremists to derail the process.¹³

Since 1990, the year that signified a new post-Cold War era, more than 80 peace accords were signed with the majority being in the Global South—with the exception of the agreements signed in Israel–Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa.¹⁴ The sheer number of peace processes has led Christine Bell to suggest deeming the 1990s as "the decade of the peace agreement."¹⁵ Nonetheless, most of the contemporary peace processes have failed; few have led to durable settlements.¹⁶ Indeed, according to Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, only one-third of settlements that were negotiated in "identity civil wars" since 1945 have resulted in a sustainable lasting peace.¹⁷ This attests not only to the resistance to resolution, but as J. Lewis Rasmussen argues, "This suggests, among other things, that (1) the struggle for political power during the implementation of an agreement is where the battle for sustainable peace is truly waged and (2) there may be shortcomings associated with the manner in which official negotiations (to end [identity] civil wars) are designed and conducted."¹⁸

It has been argued that one of the greatest shortcomings of contemporary peace processes is that they often fail to address the bitterness including the memories and images, and the sources that generate it. Over the years, there has been heated discussion in the conflict resolution literature between those who perceive the cause of conflicts to be structural and those who perceive it to be psychosocial/psychocultural. The debate has direct implications for praxis as structuralists focus on issues of rights, justice, and political issues, while those taking more of a psychocultural perspective have emphasized relationships and the need to work on eliminating the ignorance, misperceptions, fears, and

hostility between the groups, often through cooperative activities and encounters.¹⁹

More recently, in the conflict resolution field there has been the recognition that the two approaches are complementary for gaining a deeper understanding of conflict, as well as for designing more comprehensive approaches to deal with conflicts—approaches that take into account the need for both systemic change and relationship change.²⁰ In order to address what William I. Zartman refers to as the “legacy of bitterness that hampers [contemporary] conflict resolution,” it has been argued that it is critical to develop and institutionalize mechanisms that can respond to the full range of psychopolitical and socioeconomic communal needs.²¹ I will return to this later when discussing the political controversy surrounding people-to-people activities.

Conflict resolution theory was developed in response to international wars that in Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse’s words were largely “Clauswitzian affairs, fought out by power centres.”²² These wars tended to be between nation-states, and were typically symmetrical conflicts in contrast to contemporary conflicts that tend to be internal (even if significantly impacted by larger geopolitical realities), asymmetric, involve fragmented decision-making, and are often directed at civilians.²³ In recent years, as a result of these changes, there has been a broadening of the literature and a growing differentiation with regards to the types of conflicts, the dynamics, the range of interventions, and finally, the necessary components for managing conflicts and for making and building peace.

DEFINITIONS

Peace as a term is contested. Colloquially, by governments and in academia itself, peace is often defined negatively as the absence of war and physical violence. This is problematic, not least of which is that peace is often defined differently by different groups in a conflict. In order to define peace in a broader and more positive way, Johan Galtung differentiated between negative and positive peace. Whereas *negative peace* is the absence of direct violence (e.g., people being killed), *positive peace* also includes the absence of structural violence (e.g., dying as a result of poverty), and cultural violence (e.g., factors that blind people to injustice or allow them to rationalize it).²⁴ Thus, while “the negative peace of order and the cessation of direct violence” may not be compatible with justice, “the positive peace

of reconciliation and psycho/social healing” for the most part presupposes it.²⁵

Galtung also set out a tripartite typology making a distinction among peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building to guide third-party intervention efforts and clarify the different roles needed. *Peacemaking*, which conflict research has tended to focus on, refers to the negotiation process that takes place between decision-makers directed towards reaching an official settlement or resolution to specific conflicts. *Peacekeeping*, on the other hand, involves third-party intervention to keep apart warring groups and maintain the absence of direct violence (or reduce it). The third, *peace-building*, which has been the least understood, has received the least attention by conflict researchers, and has been the least operationalized in part because of its wide range of activities that receive less publicity, focuses on the social, psychological, and economic environment at the grassroots level.²⁶ The intention of peace-building is to create a structure of peace that is based on justice, equity, and cooperation (i.e., positive peace), thereby addressing the underlying causes of violent conflict so that they become less likely in the future. In the literature, peace-building is recognized as dynamic, having something to contribute in every phase of a conflict, and always moving/changing in response to the situation and the stage of the peacemaking efforts.²⁷

More recently, recognizing that conflicts do not end and they are seldom “solved,” it may not be desirable to “stop” a conflict if it is at the expense of justice, and the best way to guarantee the durability of any agreement is to be proactive and allow for higher mutual participation by the conflict groups, the term *conflict transformation* has carved a niche for itself in the peace studies and conflict resolution literature.²⁸ Lederach suggests that *transformation* involves the recognition that conflicts can progress in either constructive or destructive ways and Miall et al. argue that with its focus on transforming unjust (and unpeaceful) social relationships and addressing the root causes of conflicts, transformation is especially salient for asymmetrical conflicts.²⁹ The concept is thus in line with the peace studies tradition in which “it is [direct, structural, and/or cultural] violence, not conflict that is seen as the antithesis of peace.”³⁰

In addition to being “descriptive” with regard to the dynamics and dialectical nature of conflicts, transformation is also “prescriptive” in that it allows for a greater and more complex understanding of the multiple steps and interventions involved in a peace-building process

rather than seeing the accords as the culminating point.³¹ Miall et al. suggest a useful five-pronged framework for thinking about various forms and levels of intervention for conflict transformation. They highlight: *context transformation* at the international, regional, and/or social level; *structural transformation* focused on the root causes; *actor transformation* through a change of leaders or the constituency, or by a drastic change in their beliefs and goals; *issue transformation* through a change in positions or the salience of issues; and *personal and group transformation* which is focused on changing “hearts and minds.”³² Conceived of broadly, conflict transformation entails transformation at multiple levels, tracks, etc., with the ultimate goal of “increasing justice, reducing violence, and restoring broken relationships.”³³

In sum, while the broadening of the literature in recent years has not been without contestation, the conceptual distinctions created among the various modalities of peace and the definition of peace itself have served both descriptive and prescriptive purposes. Moreover, they have given voice to the critical role that private citizens, local initiatives, and people-to-people activities have in building peace, as well as in maintaining conflict. The remainder of this paper will be concerned with the role, impact, potential, and limitations of local and grassroots people-to-people initiatives as an approach for peace in contemporary conflicts, as well as the controversy surrounding these initiatives. In the author’s view, the controversy speaks more than anything to the need for structural interventions alongside psychocultural interventions.

PRIVATE CITIZENS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Fear, suspicion, rejection, mistrust, hatred and misperception are often greater obstacles to peace than an inability to resolve technically definable problems. Conflict has many roots, but some of today’s most intense conflicts will not be dealt with fully by focusing on states and governments ... In different ways in different systems, [citizens] ... can impel or constrain policymakers.

—Harold Saunders³⁴

The relatively new interest in comprehensive multi-dimensional, multi-level, and multi-track approaches to peace is due to the limited success of traditional diplomacy and military intervention to control protracted conflicts let alone achieve peace. Pamela Aall refers to the latter mechanisms as “the top-down approach to peace-building” and

Lederach has aptly called it the “trickle down” approach with its assumption that peace will just trickle down.³⁵

Camilla Orjuela suggests that the new interest in involving private citizens and civil society may also be due to the increased role and visibility that civilians and non-state actors have in post-Cold War conflicts. In addition to touching on the increased involvement and potential of nongovernmental organizations in conflict-torn areas, she notes the increasing role of “ordinary people,” not only as “victims of violence” as a result of their being perceived as a representative of one’s group but also as “perpetrators of violence.” It has been argued that as civilians “are so deeply involved in the structures of war, they also need to participate in efforts to prevent and end wars.”³⁶ Given the nature of adversarial relations in protracted communal conflicts, Edward Kaufman likewise argues that participating in such efforts—most notably across the conflict lines—is especially critical as these conflicts pit “people vs. people, majorities vs. minorities, and nations vs. states.”³⁷

Interestingly, Orjuela also points out that the necessity for civilians to be involved in working for peace can also be seen as “a question of representation.”³⁸ This is critical given that warring groups tend to suggest and/or assert that they “represent ‘the people.’” And indeed, whether in a democratic system or not, grassroots support is critical for the persistence of armed conflict.³⁹ In democratic systems, popular support is a necessity as leaders—through the people’s votes—can be pressured for either peace or war.⁴⁰ According to Harold Saunders, authoritarian governments have similar pressures and constraints as their policy still needs to reflect the political environment.⁴¹ It has moreover been argued that extremist groups, guerrilla groups, and other nondemocratic actors are also, to varying degrees, dependent on the people to get and/or sustain their power, legitimacy, and resources including their need to recruit.⁴²

As the history of peace processes in protracted ethnic conflicts indicates, civilian action or protest can be the decisive factor in efforts for peace (as well as war), and the literature tends to agree that for peace to be achieved and sustained, it needs to involve civilians. Many stress that without intensive grassroots activities and a strong foundation built for civil society, negotiations at the official level will not be able to “bring” either peace or justice.⁴³ The literature makes it clear that solutions must be adopted by local actors and it cannot be forced from above or imposed by the outside.⁴⁴ According to the peace-building literature, the top, the middle, and the grassroots all need to be involved.

Herbert C. Kelman argues that for a positive peace in an area that has had a long history of war, there needs to be amongst the communities' mutual acceptance, cooperative interaction, a feeling of security, space for human dignity, the institutionalization of a mechanism for problem solving, and finally, broad reconciliation.⁴⁵ Marshall and Gurr suggest that for the peace-building process to be sustainable for more than a short interlude, relief, recovery, reconciliation, and social and economic development must be integrated into the actual settlement.⁴⁶ Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Abdul Aziz Said, and Lakshitha S. Prelis would likely concur as they argue that the intervention needs to be comprehensive, complementary, and changing, and it needs to involve the political, social, economic, legal, psychological, and spiritual.⁴⁷ Speaking to the comprehensiveness and also to the challenge, Zartman powerfully argues, "Unfortunately there is no order of priority amongst them to prescribe ... All of this must be done at once and at the same time, and the steps kept apace of each other as the process moves along ... rather than as a series of discrete steps taken one step at a time."⁴⁸

As implied above, there is consensus in the peace-building field, which includes both peace studies and conflict resolution, that a peace process is more likely to succeed and be sustainable if it is comprehensive and accompanied by multitrack diplomacy and public involvement.⁴⁹ It has been argued that in the case of both Northern Ireland and South Africa that the informal diplomacy, public involvement, and grassroots dialogue were critical elements in their relatively successful peace processes.⁵⁰

MULTITRACK/MULTILEVEL

Saunders suggests, "Politics is not just a linear series of governmental decisions, actions and programs; it is a multilevel organic process of continuous interaction among people and groups."⁵¹ As indicated above, the conflict resolution and peace-building literature emphasizes that to resolve and/or transform contemporary conflicts, responses are required at different levels.⁵² Taking a macro perspective Miall et al. argue that attention may need to be paid to the international and regional level to create contextual change, the state level for structural change, the conflict party level for relational change and reconciliatory work, and finally at every level, cultural change to transform institutions and discourses that act to maintain and recreate/perpetrate violence.⁵³

Focusing within the conflict area itself, and giving voice to private citizens and the grassroots, Lederach suggests conceptualizing conflict transformation as involving three levels of work that are needed simultaneously: top (policy), middle-range (community), and grassroots work. He argues that the key to effective and strategic peace-building is coordinated relationships across the levels (i.e., horizontally) and most importantly, coordinated and responsive relationships between the levels (i.e., vertically).⁵⁴

In addition to looking at the different levels, the broadening of the field has also shifted recognition to the need for involving multiple tracks.⁵⁵ There is an awareness that if a peace agreement is to be lasting and effective, all parts of a community need to be involved including government, NGO/professional, business, private citizen, research/education, activism, religion, funding, and communications/media.⁵⁶ McDonald coined the term “multitrack diplomacy” and he and Diamond argue that it is “a systems approach to peace.”⁵⁷

TRACK TWO

Denoting a variety of unofficial, informal, and nongovernmental forms of interaction, Track Two diplomacy is one component of this “systems approach to peace” that has been increasingly gaining credibility and recognition for its unique role in peace processes. Track Two diplomacy involves bringing together scholars, senior journalists, opinion leaders, former government officials, or other politically influential individuals from conflicting parties to work together with the intention of clarifying long-standing disagreements, exploring different possibilities for resolving them, and gaining insight into the ways in which a collaborative process between the two could be promoted.⁵⁸

When official communication between the parties is constrained or blocked as it often is in protracted conflicts, Track Two complements the first track by opening up opportunities for communicating across the conflict lines, understanding the other’s interests and desires, confirming one’s own interests, and exploring viable alternative approaches that may meet the needs of both parties.⁵⁹ It can lead to ideas and insights that can be incorporated into the official governmental process and it provides space for discussions on how to viably improve the communication between the governments and/or parties, even employing prior testing methods.⁶⁰ Second track diplomacy can also help ease tensions, decrease misunderstandings, humanize “the other,” build or

strengthen civil society capacity, advance reconciliation, encourage momentum for peace by building broad public support, and/or strengthen the political will for the peacemaking process in order to increase resilience to be able to withstand a resumption of violence or any other obstacles that may present.⁶¹

Second track diplomacy can be differentiated from traditional dialogue in that communication and dialogue is not an end in itself, but rather in Track Two is linked to the negotiations and the larger political process.⁶² Kelman argues that the interactive problem-solving workshops and other Track Two approaches have a dual purpose, "to produce *changes* in the individual participants and to *transfer* these changes into the political process."⁶³ For these reasons, the participants need to be individuals who are influential politically so they can use their credibility and position to influence governmental officials and the broader society, and yet are not officials so they have more flexibility to participate in the process and will be more open to change given their distance from the decision-making process.⁶⁴

These professional approaches and actors are conceptualized by Lederach as part of "the middle range" and he argues that it is the group/level with the "greatest potential for establishing an infrastructure that can sustain the peace-building process over the long term."⁶⁵ Similarly to Kelman, he reasons that they are more connected to both the top-level leadership and the grassroots, they have more flexibility for action and movement since they are rarely in the limelight, and they often have preexisting relationships across the conflict lines due to professional associations. For Lederach, the critical component is the vertical capacity of the middle range.⁶⁶ John Davies and Edward Kaufman likewise note that in addition to having the capacity to "bridge the divide between conflicting parties," second track diplomacy also has the ability to bridge "critical divides that complicate and often retard the process of conflict transformation ... [including] the divisions between government and civil society, between elite and grassroots levels within communities, and between different cultural worldviews and assumptions about how to manage conflict and change."⁶⁷

Involving private citizens and professionals and linking the interactions to the negotiations, Track Two diplomacy complements the official diplomatic process and is an integral part of a larger multilevel, multitrack approach to making and building peace.⁶⁸

LOCAL AND GRASSROOTS INITIATIVES

While there has been growing interest in peace initiatives that occur on various tracks at the local level, there is still unfortunately little academic research in the conflict resolution and peace studies literature on grassroots peace work and people-to-people activities. The focus continues to be on the ways international actors can intervene in contemporary violent conflicts.⁶⁹

Notwithstanding the above, the local and grassroots level has been recognized in the literature as critical. Davies and Kaufman argue that multitrack diplomacy is not simply about the first two tracks, but rather it emphasizes “the idea that all parts of the community, including government, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), business, education, media, religious and funding organizations, as well as activists and other private citizens, all must be involved in the larger enterprise of peace-building to make a peace agreement effective and lasting.”⁷⁰ Most likely with the intention of making its role clearer and spelling out its connection to the other two tracks, Miall et al. have suggested that the growing emphasis on local actors could be called track three.⁷¹

Conflict transformation is often described as occurring in stages, and the literature indicates that civil society involvement is appropriate at every stage and can play significant roles whether pre-, para-, or postnegotiation.⁷² Prior to violent conflict, civil society can be involved in both early warning and prevention by addressing the deeper structural issues and conditions that are most often at the root of conflict, addressing the fears and misunderstandings between the communities which can encourage conflict, and by responding quickly to events and other occurrences that could instigate violent conflict.⁷³

In the midst of war, while their role is often diminished, civil society actors can be engaged in reporting human rights abuses, involved in relief work, engaged in psychosocial work, involved in creating grassroots training and seminars dealing with the conflict (and the aftermath) and prejudice-reduction work, designing innovative projects using the arts, promoting cooperation across the lines to build capacities for peace, working to prepare the public for negotiations, creating local peace commissions or local peace conferences, and building/strengthening the public will for peacemaking.⁷⁴

Postnegotiation—but also paranegotiation—civil society actors can be involved in sanctioning the reconstruction of infrastructure and the promotion of reconciliatory work, as well as be involved in any of a

variety of initiatives to (re)build and/or (re)connect civil society (or the civil societies) on a mutual basis.⁷⁵ In every stage, the latter is critical as it can serve preventative purposes prior to conflict, can prepare the public and promote negotiations in the midst of conflict, and can encourage negotiated settlements to be kept, communication to be continued, and a sustainable peace to be fostered postnegotiation.⁷⁶

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE—ACROSS THE LINES OF CONFLICT

“Ordinary people” who choose to move across the lines of conflict to work together on various projects or initiatives, promote cooperation, and/or strengthen their capacities have, according to the literature, a unique and significant role in conflict transformation and peacebuilding.⁷⁷ These initiatives, which have symbolic and cultural value and impact—and perhaps even political value, impact, or potential—involve a wide range of activities and are often called people-to-people projects.⁷⁸ While these initiatives cannot substitute for an official process in any way, the building of integrative ties and the establishing of relationships and shared interests can help create, build, stabilize, or strengthen the relations between the two peoples—depending on when it occurs in a peace process.

Many of these cooperative activities are focused on the social or economic realm and/or centered on scientific or technical issues.⁷⁹ Other people-to-people initiatives involve the environment, public health, education, and communication.⁸⁰ It has been argued that cross-cutting integrative ties that have a true functional value can have a tremendous impact by addressing the need for structural change by (re)structuring the social, material, and political fabric of society(ies), in addition to addressing the need for relationship change through the building of mutual ties based on equality and the fostering of trust.⁸¹ Rothstein suggests that it is the genuine value of such initiatives that allow for the above.⁸²

Other initiatives are focused on dialogue and understanding—what Saunders calls “getting to know the other side.”⁸³ There are deep commonalities between this approach and many of the track two approaches in that they involve facilitated communication between members of antagonist groups to promote conflict analysis and understanding of the other’s perspective.⁸⁴ There are two main differences: first, dialogue interventions often involve “ordinary members” of conflicting groups rather than politically influential individuals; second,

dialogue is most often geared towards building understanding and mutual trust with the hope that it would have an eventual effect on public opinion, rather than focusing on using the knowledge, understanding, and trust acquired for problem solving and designing alternative solutions.⁸⁵ Notwithstanding the above, as Ronald J. Fisher argues, ideas can be produced through dialogue and these ideas “can be fruitfully fed into the policymaking process.”⁸⁶ Furthermore, some dialogues do engage in problem solving and thus the only difference for these initiatives is that the participants are ordinary interested members of antagonist groups rather than politically influential individuals.⁸⁷

Finally, some people-to-people activities may be more simply about sharing common interests such as art, music, and athletics. These initiatives can increase the participants’ knowledge of the other and build “a sense of common humanity.”⁸⁸ In these activities, as Saunders argues, “The insights gained may provide valuable clues as to underlying causes of fear and behavior and equip a person for participation in other areas later; the immediate aim [nonetheless] is personal learning and experience rather than the resolution of problems in the near term.”⁸⁹

As implied, there is a wide range of people-to-people initiatives—from those that have more functional purposes, to those focused on dialogue, to those focused on building a sense of commonality. Nonetheless, what they all have in common is that they strive to build cross-cutting ties (and/or understanding) across the conflict line. According to the literature, building these integrative ties in and of itself is significant. Studies have shown that the amount of cross-communal interaction can explain the difference between more peaceful societies to ones with more violence.⁹⁰ Ashutosh Varshney’s 50-year study of Indian cities, for instance, compared more peaceful cities to ones stricken with violence and found that in the cities that had greater interaction between the different groups there was more interest in preventing violence.⁹¹ Nonetheless, it should be noted that contact itself is not enough and certain conditions need to be met for dialogue or cooperative activities to be effective.⁹² According to the literature on cross-communal contact, conditions are favorable when members of the different groups are of equal status, stereotypes are likely to be disconfirmed, cooperation is encouraged or necessitated, there is the potential within the contact situation for the participants to get to know each other, the broader social norms support intergroup contact and group equality, and finally, the contact situation is defined as intergroup rather than as an interpersonal encounter.⁹³ In other words, as Rachel Ben-Ari and Yehuda

Amir argue, contact “should be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient condition for producing a positive change in ethnic attitudes and relations.”⁹⁴

In addition to the array of people-to-people activities amongst adults some local projects focus on the youth. Most of these involve education with some degree of encounter work (i.e., meeting the other).⁹⁵ While all the initiatives are designed in differing contexts and differ in their goals, orientation, and functions, Gavriel Salomon argues that in the context of intractable conflicts, peace education generally has four goals: accepting the other’s narrative as legitimate; critically examining one’s own group’s acts and contribution to the conflict; feeling and showing empathy for the other’s suffering while building a trust of the other; and finally, being inclined to get involved with nonviolent activities.⁹⁶

In conclusion, the literature is clear that regardless of what form people-to-people initiatives take, the work of ordinary people meeting the other, building integrative ties, and engaging in dialogue is critical and irreplaceable as long as it is designed by both communities, taking into account both sides’ needs.⁹⁷ As Abu-Nimer argues, “If designed accordingly and, most important, jointly by the two communities, it can be a genuine tool to facilitate reconciliation.”⁹⁸

Limitations

As an approach to peace, people-to-people initiatives have their limitations. Arguably, however, these limitations simply address the fact that they are not intended to stand alone, they are only one piece of a multilevel multifaceted peace-building process, and they rely on vertical capacity (i.e., coordination between the various levels) in order to have political value and impact.

First, as it has often been argued, meeting the other through people-to-people initiatives “cannot erase, or contradict, the realities of life.”⁹⁹ Given the complexity of protracted conflicts and the intensity of conflict-torn environments, Salomon notes that many of these initiatives—referring directly to the educational interventions—tend to employ “a shot in the arm” approach.¹⁰⁰ This metaphor could be applied to the communal level with regards to their potential “to bring” peace (if conducted alone) or it can also be applied to the personal level with the recognition that even if individuals meet the other and have a powerful experience, their experience is counterbalanced upon re-entering one’s own society by other facets of socialization and experience.

The literature refers to the latter as the problem of “re-entry,” i.e., what happens to those who participated when they re-enter their society.¹⁰¹

Nonetheless, as Stephen Ryan reminds us, this is not a problem limited to the grassroots.¹⁰² Indeed, it could be said that decision-makers have the same problems with re-entry in that their perceptions may change through the negotiations or involvement in the official process and it may lead to agreements that have outpaced that of the larger publics. In different periods this has been the case in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Tamar Hermann and David Newman argue that it also has occurred in Israel–Palestine.¹⁰³ In order to address the re-entry problem of the decision-makers, peace-building work is thus critical as it can help create a population supportive to resolution initiatives—perhaps even getting the people to demand them.¹⁰⁴ Thus, while the problem of re-entry for individuals at the grassroots levels is significant and needs serious attention, it does not invalidate the significance of people-to-people initiatives, but rather it speaks to its real challenges. Likewise, it reminds that such initiatives are only one piece of a multifaceted multilevel peace-building process—and an imperfect piece given the reality.

Second, Louise Diamond and John W. McDonald point out that the negative side of the fact that civil society works parallel to the first track is that it is likely to be functioning separate from the other components of the system making it almost impossible to impact the first two tracks.¹⁰⁵ In the literature, whether this is occurring at the civil society level or the middle range level (e.g., Track Two), it is often referred to as the problem of “transfer.”¹⁰⁶ Saunders further complicates this and argues that it is not only about transfer but the grassroots also needs to know “How to translate citizen knowledge into changes in the direction of government policy and national behavior. For that translation of enhanced popular understanding into changed policy to take place, citizens must act with a precise sense of problems to be solved and policies to be changed,” which he suggests is often not considered when sweeping statements about the potential power of the grassroots are made.¹⁰⁷ Arguably, more than anything this speaks to Lederach’s argument that in peace-building there is often not a strong coordinated vertical axis and without it—and as Saunders reminds without the critical knowledge on how to affect change—the grassroots is likely to not be heard or effective.¹⁰⁸ Lederach proposes strong vertical capacity and he suggests that middle-range actors may be in the best place for this.¹⁰⁹

Saunders implies the need for a precise and practical form of education for change.¹¹⁰

While perhaps not as critical as the vertical gap, the lack of horizontal capacity is also a limitation. In many ways this gap between initiatives is not surprising given the different goals and orientations of initiatives—not to mention the practical issues of limited time and funding competition—but nonetheless, several peace-builders have noted the need for more coordination on these lines. As Salomon argues, “With many small interventions, even if they have continuity to them, they do not necessarily connect to each other. Trying to plan something systemic is pretentious, but on the other hand the different components may combine together [to really create something].”¹¹¹

Obstacles

Local and grassroots peace-building initiatives (including people-to-people projects) often face numerous obstacles. In brief, these include opposition from governments and/or elites; backlash from those opposed to meeting *the other* (i.e., rejectionists); little access to the areas that tend to be more hard-lined and the unfortunate tendency “to preach to the converted”; lack of progress on the political level and the long-term continuation of goals that are incompatible; “the re-politicization of peace-building initiatives”; and finally limited resources and a lack of infrastructure for peace-building (i.e., money, trained workers, research, and acceptable and viable venues for meeting).¹¹²

Challenges of Attribution

In complex realities where there are a multitude of actors and interests at play, it is challenging to measure the impact of dialogue and people-to-people activities. Suggesting that attribution in these complex situations is a problem, Saunders argues, “The larger problem is that social and political capacity, relationships, political processes, and interlocking networks in civil society do not respond to measurement in social-science research designs ... It is even more difficult when one must take into account continuous change or determine who in the complex interaction of multiple actors ‘caused’ an outcome.”¹¹³ Salomon likewise notes that it is difficult to measure whether there is a “ripple effect” stemming from those who meet the other.¹¹⁴ He suggests that there is also the added complexity of the “sleeper effect”

in which the effects may take time and may only be recognized significantly later.

Due to the complex reality, David Hulme and Jonathan Goodhand argue that “impact” is not an appropriate concept for measuring peace-building activities and all that we can do is look at such nongovernmental activities as “increasing or decreasing the *probabilities* for peace or conflict.”¹¹⁵ Meanwhile, Christopher Mitchell differentiates between internal and external effectiveness where internal addresses the impact on the participants’ perceptions and external addresses the impact (or lack of impact) on the conflict.¹¹⁶

During Times of Violence

During times of tension and violence, which often bring about increased polarization between the conflicting parties, there is often less direct exchange largely because meeting the other becomes more difficult both practically and emotionally.¹¹⁷ Moreover, at least in the case of Palestine–Israel, when the peace process stalled in 2000, it was many of the organizations that used dialogue with the goals of building understanding, altering opinions, etc., that were the ones to fail.¹¹⁸ This, in many ways, is not surprising as Lewis A. Coser suggests “limited departures from the group unity” tend to be tolerated by groups in conflict.¹¹⁹ At the time of this writing, it still remains to be seen how much impact the Hamas election in 2006 will have on people-to-people initiatives. The radicalization of the political environment—and the ratcheting up of political extremism—could further impact and erode the potential of people-to-people initiatives. Thus while people-to-people initiatives and dialogue are seen as appropriate for every stage of a conflict, given the difficulties and the often few encounters during these times, such initiatives beg the question—do these actually make a difference or is the fact that they are persisting simply “feel good”?

Integrative Ties — Theory

Sociologists William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani drew on the concept of tension, which was conceptualized as a tendency of a social system towards disintegration, and argued that while “the severity of explicit disagreements between nations ... seems to be an essential element [for tension] ... it is not sufficient.”¹²⁰ Thus they looked at the integrative forces (e.g., social, political, and economic bonds) that keep

a social system from “breaking” and suggest that tension is “the ratio of disintegrative forces to integrative ties existing between two nations ... at any given point in time ($T = D/I$).”¹²¹

From this conceptualization of tension, four properties can be drawn that relate to peace-building. First, tension can be decreased either by “decreasing disintegrative forces” or “increasing integrative ties” (i.e., cross-cutting ties; people-to-people initiatives).¹²² Second, the level of integrative ties is inversely related to “the amount by which a disagreement of given importance will raise tension” (thus an increase in integrative forces will have more of an impact in a system that has fewer integrative ties). Third, the level of integrative ties is inversely related to “the amount by which the settlement of a disagreement of given importance will lower tension” (thus implying that the tension level will remain more stable and will be less impacted by changes in disintegrative forces in a system that has a greater amount of integrative ties). And finally, the existing level of integrative ties is directly proportional to “the existing level of tension” and inversely related to “the amount by which a given increase or decrease in integrative ties will change tension.”¹²³

It should first be noted that Gamson qualifies the above recognizing that not all integrative forces are just and/or beneficiary for all parties involved.¹²⁴ Louis Kreisberg likewise suggests that high integration can mean anything from free assimilation to slavery depending on whether there is mutual and little imposition or severe and unilateral imposition.¹²⁵ In fact, Kreisberg suggests, “Movement toward greater mutuality ... can [actually] result in accommodations with *reduced* integration between communal groups. Increased freedom by one people from the domination of another can foster the expression and elaboration of cultural differences and the preference for autonomy or independence” (my own emphasis).¹²⁶ Notwithstanding the above, the focus of this section is integrative/cross-cutting ties that are beneficiary for both sides. A more critical analysis will follow.

Utilizing this theory, several arguments can be made about the impact of small integrative and/or cross-cutting ties. The first suggests that increasing integrative bonds when they are low to non-existent will have a greater impact on reducing tension than if the existing integrative forces were many. In other words, where there are few ties, a small increment makes a bigger difference. In many ways this makes intuitive sense. Speaking to the value and significance of such ties in the highly stratified nature of Northern Ireland, John Morrow, who co-led the

Corrymeela Community, a joint center for reconciliation in Northern Ireland, notes, "The value of a centre jointly owned by people from both traditions, yet independent of the control of the official establishments either political or ecclesiastical, can only be understood in terms of the norms of Northern Irish society."¹²⁷ In other words, a center such as this has greater significance and impact (symbolically, culturally, and viably politically) on relations in a society that is highly polarized and has few integrative ties than it would have if centers like this were less unique and/or more the norm.

Second, it suggests that decreasing the disintegrative forces by withdrawing energy from the way each side perceives the other decreases tension. This shift in perception then viably feeds into and influences the political environment. Indeed, referring to the interactive problem-solving workshops and other Track Two approaches, Kelman suggests, the "two most important elements of a supportive political environment, to which workshops contributed, are the sense of mutual reassurance, which reduces the parties' fear of negotiations as a threat to their existence, and the sense of possibility—the perception that there is 'a way out' of the conflict, which enhances their belief that negotiations, though difficult and risky, can produce an acceptable agreement."¹²⁸ This is a goal for most people-to-people initiatives as well as Track Two encounters and as the literature makes clear, the challenges at both the local and middle range level—as well as the possibilities—lie in the "re-entry period" and "transfer" with regards to affecting policy and the official decision-making process.¹²⁹ While the transfer process is more often associated with Track Two diplomacy, the transfer process could occur in various ways at the local level as well from putting pressure on key actors, striving to educate the elite who are connected to the political leadership (the clear focus of Track Two), and bottom-up change.¹³⁰

Third, it suggests that integrative/cross-cutting ties could also allow for promoting a frame about the conflict involving two rights instead of a right and wrong. As Gamson notes, "On most political issues, there are competing interpretations, ways of framing information and facts in alternative ways ... one can view social movement actors as engaged in a symbolic contest over which meaning will prevail."¹³¹ The frame advanced by people-to-people initiatives promotes compromise and could be seen as working on the resolution of disagreements. This is critical as the way people react is greatly motivated by one's frame/perception. Drawing on Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's social reality construction theory, framing is "the conflicting parties' views of reality,

external to themselves, and by which they are controlled and constrained” and when there is one right and one wrong, it inevitably leads to a “clash of contending realities” which spur the continuation of misunderstandings and the perpetuation of stereotypes.¹³² A shift to a frame that involves two rights, such as Gamson’s “dual-liberation approach,” is critical as it allows each side to know that the other has heard them and recognized the validity of their struggle/position, which in turn makes it easier to hear the other and begin to create a mutual understanding.¹³³ Pertaining to Track Two encounters and people-to-people initiatives, Kelman notes that “In particular, problem-solving workshops can provide an arena for the ‘negotiation of identity’ ... [which] means finding ways, through an interactive process, whereby conflicting parties can accommodate their collective identities, and the associated national narratives, to one another—at least to the extent of eliminating from their own identities the negation of the other and the claim of exclusivity.”¹³⁴ Perhaps more than anything, a framing of two rights with the accompanied negotiation of identity allows for possibility.

Finally, it can be drawn from this that integrative ties (or cross-cutting ties) reduce the cultural fallout from disagreements—the rancor, bile, and mistrust—which enhance the objective disagreements and make them harder to resolve on their merits. This is critical given that the intractability and escalation of conflicts are often due to the social, psychological, and cultural factors.¹³⁵ In fact, Saunders argues, “Fear, suspicion, rejection, mistrust, hatred, and misperception are often greater obstacles to peace than an inability to resolve technically definable problems. Conflict has many roots, but some of today’s most intense conflicts will not be dealt with fully by focusing on states and governments.”¹³⁶ Interestingly, he notes that in 1959, President Eisenhower asked the current *Saturday Review* editor, Norman Cousins, to initiate a dialogue between U.S. citizens and Soviet citizens so “there would be a channel of communication between the nuclear superpowers when government relations soured.”¹³⁷

While the focus of this section is on the impact of integrative/cross-cutting ties during acute violence, it could also be drawn from this that integrative and/or cross-cutting ties could serve preventative and paranegotiation functions by increasing understanding, stemming some of the fears, creating a more supportive public, and strengthening political will, which will provide more latitude when larger objective disagreements come up in a peace process. Hermann and Newman argue that this is precisely what did not occur in Israel–Palestine.¹³⁸

They note, “The signing of formal agreements has not been enough for the transition of both peoples from a conflict-oriented mentality to a conflict-resolution-oriented state of mind. Thus, when the formal negotiations did not progress smoothly or reached a dead end, no significant pressures from below were exerted on the decision-makers to make greater concessions in order to push the process forward. *On the contrary, the leaders of both sides have had to invest great efforts in sustaining grass-roots support for the process, while at the same time often being blamed by their followers for being too compliant towards the other side*” (my emphasis). Such ties prior could have arguably helped to bring the people with the process. Gershon Baskin notes that during the peace process, only 0.05 percent of each society met the other in people-to-people initiatives—and of this half-of-one percent, one-third of the encounters were among the elite, one-third were among professionals, and only one-third was among the grassroots.¹³⁹

This serves to summon up the difficulties. With direct meaning for peace-building, Gamson and Modigliani suggest, “Changes in integrative ties are neither as frequent nor as dramatic as changes in disintegrative forces.”¹⁴⁰ Reflecting on Israel–Palestine, Manuel Hassassian and Edward Kaufman articulately speak to this with their observation that, “The fragility of such undertakings [i.e., peace-building activities] have often declined as a result of terror by committed fundamentalist extremists from both sides ... Extremist groups using violence, civil disobedience, and insubordination on both sides have bypassed the cumulative impact of the many activists involved in ‘people-to-people’ activities, despite the fact that the former group constitutes a smaller portion of activists.”¹⁴¹ While at face value this may seem to contradict Gamson and Modigliani’s ratio model of tension, when one considers the full array of disintegrative forces (e.g., objective disagreements with their perceived centrality and importance; public opinion and perceptions on the whole ...), this simply addresses the challenges peace-building, and peace-builders, face.¹⁴² Indeed, as Diamond argues, “The forces of war have an existing infrastructure that enables them to mobilize and actualize their aims—they have armies and arms suppliers; transportation, commerce and communication systems; banking, taxing and other funding methods; media, education and propaganda systems; and government ministries, clans, villages, political parties and other entities capable of taking action. The forces of peace have little of this ...” She argues that while an infrastructure for peace-building has progressed in recent years, significantly more needs to be done, “to

create both a human and an institutional infrastructure for peace-building."¹⁴³ This is especially true in conflict-torn societies during times of acute violence as the infrastructure can be significantly impacted.

Notwithstanding the above, it may be well to recall the first property that suggests when there are low to nonexistent integrative bonds, increasing them will have a greater impact on reducing tension than if the existing integrative forces were many. Thus a smaller increment does make, in such circumstances, a bigger difference.

POLITICAL CONTROVERSY

Peace-building, however, has not been without its share of scrutiny and critiques—some of them quite valid. First, broadly speaking, the field of conflict resolution has always been controversial, drawing criticism from realists who see the field as “soft-headed” and naïve for not placing a greater focus on power and coercion. At the other end of the spectrum, the field has been critiqued by some radical thinkers who argue that the field is misconceived as it is not situated within a larger analysis of the global forces of oppression and exploitation.¹⁴⁴

People-to-people initiatives, more specifically, have also received their share of critiques. The obvious critiques, which I will not deal with, tend to come from the extreme right in conflict-torn societies or from those who argue that meeting the other is traitorous.¹⁴⁵ One less obvious place that these critiques have originated, but critical as they raise significant issues, is from the conflict groups that are engaged in resistance and are struggling for structural change whether the goal is autonomy, access, or distributive justice. Given that these critiques often come from the minority group or the group with less power raises certain fundamental questions. First, what are these integrative/cross-cutting ties being used for (and what are they not being used for)? And second, whose interests are being served by decreasing tension with integrative ties? Are both sides benefiting or is it only one side?¹⁴⁶

The critiques include the following: First, it has been argued that little can be gained and that these initiatives are based on a mistaken perception that bringing people together—or cooperation in the professional, scientific, and academic realm—can facilitate peace.¹⁴⁷

Second, oppressed groups have contended that it does not take into account their priorities and it is a waste of both time and limited resources.¹⁴⁸ From their perspective—and often validly given their social, political, and economic reality—is that they have more pressing things

to deal with. In many conflict situations there often is a direct connection between the different groups' establishment of priorities and Robert Inglehart's theory that economic development comes before ecology in the minds of people. Although we are not talking about ecology and the environment, we can replace the word dialogue for ecology, and add in either rights to access, self-determination, or equality with economic development to see the same phenomena. In other words, freedom and justice before dialogue.¹⁴⁹

Third, a case has been made that such initiatives ignore the significant asymmetry between conflict groups.¹⁵⁰ Looking at the Israeli–Palestinian case, Rothstein notes some of the problems with this: “The history of a relationship between occupier and occupied creates structural impediments to cooperation on a basis of equality and reciprocity. In the economic sphere, for example, access to jobs in Israel is vital to the Palestinian economy, yet the reliance on these jobs reinforces the dependence of the Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy that resulted from the occupation. These difficulties demonstrate why functional relations cannot be meaningfully pursued apart from the political process.”¹⁵¹ These difficulties are not only in the economic realm. Indeed, Palestinian Health Organizations have argued similarly that the international focus on joint projects rather than the development of their health and medical infrastructure maintains dependence on Israeli health services rather than allowing them to create an infrastructure that is independent and sustainable.¹⁵²

Finally, groups with less power have argued that the initiatives tend to be imposed from the outside. They note that cooperative projects are often made a condition for international support.¹⁵³ In addition, for conflict groups that are engaged in resistance and are working for change, cooperation tends to be viewed as a bargaining chip in the negotiations—and a critical negotiation chip given that they have less real power. It may thus be seen as being forced upon them without their first being able to obtain their basic rights and freedoms (i.e., when the fundamental relationship between the parties has not changed). This can understandably be quite angering as the real or perceived imposition of people-to-people projects on such groups is on top of the larger structural imposition that such conflict groups resisting are struggling to change.¹⁵⁴

The suggestion has been made that people-to-people activities are more important in conflicts such as South Africa and Northern Ireland as the peace process is oriented towards integration rather than

separation such as in the case of Israel–Palestine. Kriesberg argues, “To achieve more than minimal coexistence, that is, peaceful accommodations marked by moderate to high integration and by moderate to little unilateral imposition, significant and broad reconciliation is important. Reconciliation can be quite limited between groups in accommodations that involve little integration and/or high unilateral imposition.”¹⁵⁵ Nonetheless, in the Palestinian–Israeli case as well, it has been stated, “We can’t afford to have a cold peace. We are too close. We are sitting in each other’s laps ...”¹⁵⁶

Gamson and Modigliani’s properties, which indicate that when there are few integrative ties a small increment makes a bigger difference, help to shed some light on why this can be such a heated issue.¹⁵⁷ On the most basic level, one needs to ask—would a decrease in tension be an interest—let alone a priority—for conflict groups that are struggling for liberation, autonomy, access, or distributive justice? As Lederach notes, it is often groups that are oppressed who initiate direct violence in order to change structural violence.¹⁵⁸ While these groups are also impacted by direct violence—and most often disproportionately so—their main focus is on issues of justice and not necessarily decreasing tension through integrating/cross-cutting ties unless this will lead to justice. In fact, it is often creating tension that is believed to create structural change. Perhaps not surprisingly, Hassassian and Kaufman suggest that coexistence and dialogue can often be seen by “minority” groups as false normalization with normalization being perceived as something that will come after—and only after—these groups secure full recognition of their rights and freedoms.¹⁵⁹ For instance, it has been argued that for Palestinian academics, “Justice takes precedence over any contrived desire for peace because it is exactly this justice, or the lack thereof, that Palestinians continue to suffer from. Peace offers the cessation of violence, but justice offers them an acknowledgment that such violence was inflicted unjustly, along with the cessation of violence. Justice assuages the pain of military defeat whereas peace becomes interpreted as relinquishing the justice of their cause and acknowledgement of their military defeat.”¹⁶⁰ In a similar vein, Zoughbi Elias Zoughbi suggests that preaching reconciliation and nonviolence to Palestinians can “Convey a delegitimization of their struggle to end apartheid, injustice, occupation, and colonial expansionism and power.”¹⁶¹ Indeed, as Dan Bar-On contends, “When trying to resolve a long-term violent conflict in which violence is employed, preaching for coexistence and dialogue may often be interpreted by the minority group

and/or the group seeking change as an effort by the majority group to maintain their dominance rather than redistribute power and control."¹⁶² One debate that this raises is whether justice is a prerequisite of reconciliation as Zehr argues, or a component of reconciliation as Lederach suggests.¹⁶³ Not surprisingly, given the power of social locations in shaping knowledge, this is often looked upon differently by different groups in conflict and it tends to be correlated with each groups' power position.

Amy S. Hubbard and many others raise the question: Does political action follow from dialogue and people-to-people initiatives?¹⁶⁴ While she gives no clear answer, she makes some critical points. Most notably, she suggests that it is not an easy translation given that dialogue often involves a conflict resolution frame, and for social action, this frame does not get one too far; a social justice frame is what is needed. Indeed Gamson suggests that an injustice frame, which involves political awareness laden with moral indignation and "a consciousness of motivated human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering," is one of the three critical components of collective action frames.¹⁶⁵ An identity component is another critical element of collective action frames and in contrast to the conflict resolution frame, it often involves a stark "we" versus "they."¹⁶⁶ In the conflict resolution frame "the target is often diffused throughout the whole civil society and the 'they' being pursued is structurally elusive."¹⁶⁷ Thus, while the conflict resolution framing may be able to lend some insight, and have some value and impact, the value and impact will most likely remain on the cultural level.

Critically assessing dialogue, Jonathan Kuttub argues that "When dialogue becomes a substitute for action, there are two results. First, it assuages the conscience of members of the oppressor group to the point where they feel they do not have to do anything else. The conscience is soothed and satisfied. On the other hand, for the members of the oppressed group it becomes a safety valve for venting frustrations. In both cases it becomes a means of reinforcing the existing oppression and therefore serves to perpetuate it."¹⁶⁸

Ideally, people-to-people initiatives and dialogue would occur alongside political movement and structural change. As Abu-Nimer argues, "The process of reconciliation only succeeds, develops, or gains momentum among the different communities if it is *not* divorced from structural arrangements. Reconciliation without addressing or beginning to address physical reconstruction of houses, returnees,

infrastructural elements, redistribution of resources, and other economic needs will be resented if characterized as a sell-out by a large number of the communities.”¹⁶⁹

But what about when things are not moving on the official political level? What should be done? Arguably, this is when it is most critical for civil society and international donors to strive to meet the people’s needs. As the letter from the Palestinian Health Organizations indicated, if cooperative projects are all that are stressed this could stir significant anger.¹⁷⁰ At the same time, to put things in perspective, it should be remembered that during times of violence there are often few dialogues and/or people-to-people projects going on. And debatably, given the reality of deep-rooted protracted conflicts, there does need to be effort by the international community to integrate strategies that can encourage conflict transformation, peace-building, and integrative or cross-cutting ties. While it is not an easy balance, the key is likely having people-to-people initiatives be a critical part of the whole—one that needs to be encouraged by donors—*but* is only one part of the whole, which includes a variety of actions including building infrastructure, sustainable development, and relief. It needs to be remembered that the latter are also significant parts of peace-building, which is centered on overcoming contradictions—structural, relational, and cultural.¹⁷¹

For the group seeking change there is often a desire to see the other take concrete actions to change the political reality, which as Hassassian and Kaufman urge needs to be kept in mind by the peace-builders in the stronger conflict group.¹⁷²

Orjuela suggests that at the local and grassroots level—for both conflict groups—there are at least three different forms that peace work can take: pressuring key actors, building/strengthening a movement among ordinary people, or working as intermediaries between grassroots and key actors.¹⁷³ Hassassian and Kaufman would likely agree as they note that two crucial and missing components of people-to-people activities are, first, attempts to impact public opinion on a wider scale through various modes of mass media, and, second, efforts to impact policymakers’ attitudes. Unless this changes, their description of people-to-people work initiatives as “positive, but introverted activities that lack clear political objectives ...” is unlikely to change.¹⁷⁴

While it is not easy for many NGOs focused on conflict resolution to incorporate clear political objectives, it could be argued that by strengthening the connection to the action piece, not only will these initiatives have more value and impact, but they will be more able to

meet the needs of the different conflict groups.¹⁷⁵ Peace-building would do well to heed Sharon Kurtz's argument that "What is at stake is not only unity versus schism, as conventional organizer wisdom suggests, but resources and level of mobilization as well."¹⁷⁶ In order to involve both groups in peace-building, both sides' needs and wishes have to be taken into account and incorporated. According to the literature, after all, this is what peace-building is about. I would agree with Abu-Nimer that "The coexistence field can be used for a political manipulation function if designed according to the needs, desires, and values of one community only. On the other hand, if designed accordingly and, most important, jointly by the two communities, it can be a genuine tool to facilitate reconciliation."¹⁷⁷

This would involve being cognizant of the tension that often arises between the conflict resolution and the social justice frame—both critical elements in peace-building—and recognizing the values and limitations in each.¹⁷⁸ In order to meet the needs of both communities and design a more comprehensive and sustainable peace-building process, it is critical to engage both frames *simultaneously*. As Kriesberg notes, "The priority people place on any single goal, be it peace, justice, or even coexistence, should not be absolute. Each is desirable, as is freedom, security, and economic well-being. At some level, there are trade-offs among all these values that each of us would seek and defend. People are likely to differ, within given historical circumstances, about the relative priority of various goals, but such differences between adversaries can contribute to constructing mutually acceptable settlements."¹⁷⁹ In this case, recognizing the significance of integrative ties—especially when ties are few—may involve finding a way to ensure that the lowering of tension is accompanied by political action and structural change.

In many ways, it comes down to whether the conflict groups can trust each other with regards to the purpose of integrative/cross-cutting ties. Are the ties for the negative peace of order or the positive peace that embodies justice? In other words, can they trust that the end goal is one that will incorporate one's own side's definition of peace? For instance, with regards to the Israeli–Palestinian case, this would involve recognizing and taking into account that for Israelis, peace tends to be defined as personal and national security, and for Palestinians, peace tends to be defined as the right of sovereignty, freedom of movement, and liberation. As the prisoners dilemma illustrates, not knowing if one can trust the other, the rational choice individually tends to create a

lose-lose outcome, whereas if both can communicate, guarantee to the other that he or she can be trusted and will not defect, the rational choice collectively could deliver the hard-to-accomplish win-win situation.¹⁸⁰ While getting to this place in a polarized deep-rooted protracted conflict is not easy, as the properties drawn from Gamson and Modigliani make clear, the few integrative ties that persist during difficult times have more value, impact, and potential than they would if the ties were many.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, if these ties are based on action as well as communication, and justice as well as peace, these ties provide the quality upon which an infrastructure for positive peace—or peace with justice—can be built.

CONCLUSION

While the fields of conflict resolution and peace-building have grown significantly in recent years, we are still in the beginning stages of developing frameworks for both the resolution of wars and the building of peace. As a result, there are still numerous questions that need to be asked. I will touch on several of these questions as they relate to third track peace-building initiatives that involve cross-cutting or integrative ties (i.e., people-to-people initiatives).

First, it needs to be asked and studied how these various people-to-people initiatives operate and function, most notably during periods of acute violence and how effective they are and how much (and what type of) impact they can have (e.g., symbolic, cultural, political ...). Further attention needs to be paid to how these initiatives adapt (or do not adapt) to the different conflict phases and what impact periods of heavy violence or breakdowns of peace processes have on these initiatives including the impact on the types and frequency of cross-cutting activities and what develops in such encounters, the impact on who the participants are, and finally, the impact on their goals and objectives. Moreover, critical analysis is needed with regards to whether there is tension surrounding these goals or focuses (both in and out of the encounter), whether these objectives or priorities take into account the interests of both sides, and if there is tension, whether manifest or latent, how it is expressed. Furthermore, in the initiatives themselves, it needs to be asked how the problem of asymmetry is dealt with.

Secondly, further study needs to be conducted on how effective these initiatives are “internally” for the participants during such difficult times. In line with this, there needs to be an exploration of how the

problems of re-entry are handled and, moreover, how easily these efforts may be reversible. Further research is needed on whether there are certain conditions that must be met for cooperative activities and dialogue to be effective, and if so what are they and what are the implications for times of acute violence.

While attribution can be challenging, if not impossible in complex realities, when things are not moving on the political level it also needs to be asked how much impact these initiatives have “externally” on the conflict and what can be done to strengthen the impact. For instance, it needs to be explored whether these initiatives contribute to a sense of mutual reassurance and a feeling of possibility, which Kelman suggests are the most critical elements of a political environment, whether they contain and promote an implicit framing of the conflict as one that concerns two rights, rather than a right and a wrong, as Gamson proposes, and whether there is a “ripple effect” as Salomon asks stemming from those who meet the other.¹⁸² Furthermore, it needs to be asked how effective the transfer process is. For example, are the ideas fostered in people-to-people initiatives fed into the official peacemaking process? Are there efforts by individuals to influence the policymakers? Are there attempts to build grassroots movements? In other words, do these initiatives lead to action, and if so, what types of actions? And is the translation to action difficult, as Hubbard suggests, for initiatives that rely on a traditional conflict resolution frame and if so what does this mean?¹⁸³

On a different note, it needs to be asked, do these cross-cutting or integrative ties strengthen the relations between the two peoples and can these ties provide the infrastructure for a just peace to be built? This would involve exploring whether there is horizontal and vertical capacity, as Lederach rightly urges, allowing for strategic peace-building.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, it is critical to explore how these initiatives sustain themselves, what opposition exists, how it is expressed, what are the constraints that restrict peace-building (and peace-builders) from being more effective and strategic, and what are the possibilities.

Finally, given the difficulties and challenges of being involved in peace-building work during times of acute violence or serious setbacks in peace processes, it is also important, for reasons of sustainability, to look into the personal reasons people have for being engaged in this work and persevering during the precarious, difficult, and often highly polarized periods. For instance, what factors contribute to persistence and what specific things do people do to maintain their commitments and allow them to be committed over the long haul? It should also be

explored what causes certain people to engage in this work, what does it do for them personally, what do they hope to accomplish at the end of the day, how do they envision the possibilities, potential, limitations, and constraints of peace-building, and finally, how have their thoughts and perspectives changed/evolved over the years?

Gamson and Modigliani's principles, which make clear the absolute significance of a few cross-cutting or integrative ties in societies where the ties are few and far between, complement Lederach's approach to peace-building.¹⁸⁵ Recognizing that peace-building is often done with few resources, Lederach argues for the need to be constructive and strategic by simultaneously focusing on engendering a better quality of process and building on what exists that may have "exponential potential."¹⁸⁶ Drawing upon his analogy of yeast which speaks of how something small can be a critical ingredient for getting bread to rise, he suggests, "In sustaining peace, the critical yeast suggests that the measuring stick is not a question of quantity, as in the number of people. It is a question of the quality of relational spaces, intersections, and interactions that affect a social process beyond the numbers involved."¹⁸⁷ We need to think quality and strategy, and we also need to remember that when there are little to no ties, a few cross-cutting ties make a significantly greater difference and need to be sustained—not only because of their contribution during this volatile time, which though present may not be readily observed, but just as much if not more so, because these ties (if embodied with quality and engaged with strategy) can serve, when the time is ripe, as the foundation for an infrastructure for peace; a positive peace.

NOTES

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1. Quoted in J. L. Rasmussen, "Negotiating a Revolution: Toward Integrating Relationship Building and Reconciliation into Official Peace Negotiations," in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 101.

2. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005).

3. Mikael Erikson and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1989–2003," *Journal of Peace Research* 41/5 (2004): 625–636.
4. Marshall and Gurr, *Peace and Conflict*. Marshall and Gurr define "major armed conflict" as a period/incident of political violence which presents persistent and systematic armed violence and involves at least 100 deaths related to the conflict each year and over 1,000 spread throughout its course (*ibid.*, 77).
5. Robert L. Rothstein, "In Fear of Peace: Getting Past Maybe," in *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, ed. Robert L. Rothstein (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 1–25.
6. Marshall and Gurr, *Peace and Conflict*.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Edward E. Azar, "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict," in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work*, eds. Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrios A. Julius (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 93–120; John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep-rooted Conflict: A Handbook* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987); Louis Kriesberg, Terrell A. Northrup, and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.) *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1989).
9. Azar, "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict," 93.
10. Burton, *Resolving Deep-rooted Conflict*.
11. Benjamin Gidron, Stanley N. Katz, and Yeheskel Hasenfeld, "Introduction, Theoretical Approach, and Methodology," in *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa*, eds. Benjamin Gidron, Stanley N. Katz, and Yeheskel Hasenfeld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3–35.
12. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, "Introduction: Comparing Peace Processes," in *The Management of Peace Processes*, eds. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 1–15; Edward E. Azar, "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict"; John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); Camilla Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War: Peace Work and Identity Politics in Sri Lanka," PhD dissertation, Göteborg University, 2004.
13. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*; Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers, "From Political Mobilization to the Politics of Consciousness," in *The Politics of Ethnic Consciousness*, eds. Cora Govers and Hans Vermeulen (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 1997), 1–30; Edward (Edy) Kaufman, "Prospects and Problems for Mobilizing Civil Society

in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” in *To Live Together*, ed. Daniel S. Halperin (Paris, France: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1997), 18–26.

It is essential to recognize that contemporary conflicts also have strong external influences and “international linkages” (Azar, “The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict”). As Levy contends, “To the extent that most wars generally involve the mutual and interactive decisions of two or more adversaries, an explanation for the outbreak of war logically requires including dyadic- or systemic-level variables.” While I will not attend to it in this paper, it is critical to recognize that external actors and global forces significantly shape and influence contemporary conflicts. As Derber (personal communication, 2005) argues, a case could be made that these conflicts are “intimately tied to large global interests and powers,” which include the foreign policy interests of the leading powers in the system—most notably U.S. foreign policy and expansionism in our unipolar system—as well as the interests of other foreign interventionists. Azar, “The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict”; and Jack S. Levy, “Contending Theories of International Justice,” in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 5. For critical scholarship in this area with a focus on U.S. foreign policy, see Charles Derber, *Regime Change Begins at Home* (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2005); Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003); William Blum, *Rogue State* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000).

14. John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Darby and Mac Ginty, “Introduction: Comparing Peace Processes.” This is not surprising given that since the beginning of the 21st century, the majority of wars themselves have been in Africa and South Central Asia (see Marshall and Gurr, *Peace and Conflict*).

15. Christine Bell, “Human Rights and Minority Protection,” in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict Violence and Peace Processes*, eds. Darby and Mac Ginty (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 161.

16. Fernand de Varennes, “Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of Content and Approaches,” in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, eds. Darby and Mac Ginty (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 151–160; Wendy Lambourne, “Justice and Reconciliation: Postconflict Peace-Building in Cambodia and Rwanda,” in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 311–338.

17. Cited in Lambourne, "Justice and Reconciliation."
18. J. Lewis Rasmussen, "Negotiating a Revolution," 103. Given that the political struggle persists after agreements are signed revolving around their implementation, perhaps it is not surprising that in many of the contemporary peace processes there have been breaches of accords and violations of ceasefires. Albert Jongman, *The World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2000* (paper prepared for the Uppsala Conference on Conflict Data, June 7–10, 2001).
19. Mari Fitzduff, "The Challenge to History: Justice, Coexistence, and Reconciliation Work in Northern Ireland," in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 255–274.
20. John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage, 1996); Erin McCandless, "The Case of Land in Zimbabwe: Cause of Conflict, Foundation for Sustained Peace," in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001); Fitzduff, "The Challenge to History."
21. William I. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 269. Also see Azar, "The Analysis and Management of Protracted Conflict."
22. Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Malden, MA: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1999), 15.
23. *Ibid.* It is estimated that 80 percent of the several million people who have been killed in ongoing wars are civilians. See John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman (eds.), *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy: An Overview* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 1.
24. Johan Galtung, "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-building," in *Peace, War and Defence—Essays in Peace Research*, 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1975), 282–304; Johan Galtung, "The Specific Contribution of Peace Research to the Study of Violence: Typologies," in *Violence and its Causes*, ed. United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization (Paris, France: UNESCO, 1981), 83–96. While defined in the negative, it should be noted that in the literature, peace is also defined as a continuous process rather than a passive state. Joseph V. Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*, eds. John W. McDonald and Diane B. Bendahmane (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1987), 5–20.
25. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 208.

26. Johan Galtung, "Peace Education: Problems and Conflicts," in *Education for Peace*, ed. Magnus Haavelsrud (Guildford, CT: Science and Technology Press, 1976); Galtung, "Three Approaches to Peace"; Stephen Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 223–265; Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

27. Lederach, *Building Peace*.

28. See, e.g., Mari Fitzduff, "The Challenge to History"; Johan Galtung, "Conflict Resolution as Conflict Transformation: The First Law of Thermodynamics Revisited," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (London: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 51–64; Carolyn Nordstrom, "Contested Identities/Essentially Contested Powers," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 93–115; Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*; Laura Nader, *Harmony, Ideology, Justice, and Control in Sapotic Mountain Village* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Laura Nader, "When Is Popular Justice Popular?" in *The Possibility of Popular Justice*, eds. Sally Engle Merry and Neal Milner (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 435–454; Hizkias Assefa, "The Meaning of Reconciliation," in *People Building Peace*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (The Hague, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 37–45; Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*; Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), *Conflict Transformation* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Adam Curle, *Tools for Transformation: A Personal Study* (Glasgow, UK: Hawthorn Press, 1991); Kriesberg et al., *Intractable Conflicts*.

29. Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*; Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*.

30. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 222.

31. For further discussion on this see Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*.

32. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 156–157.

33. Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*, 23.

34. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*, 74.

35. Pamela Aall, "Nongovernmental Organizations and Peacemaking," in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 439; Lederach, *Building Peace*, 45.

36. Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War," 18–19.

37. Kaufman, "Prospects and Problems for Mobilizing Civil Society," 19.

38. Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War," 19.

39. *Ibid.*, 19.

40. Harold H. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process* (New York: Palgrave, 1999).

41. Ibid.
42. Avraham Sela, personal communication, 1997; Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War."
43. Rasmussen, "Negotiating a Revolution"; McCandless, "The Case of Land"; Lambourne, "Justice and Reconciliation"; Fitzduff, "The Challenge to History"; Hizkias Assefa, "The Meaning of Reconciliation," in *People Building Peace*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (The Hague, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 37–45; Stephen Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict," in *Conflict Transformation*, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (London: St. Martin's Press).
44. Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*; and Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War."
45. Herbert C. Kelman, "Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies: A Social-Psychological Approach," in *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, ed. Robert L. Rothstein (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
46. Marshall and Gurr, *Peace and Conflict*.
47. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Abdul Aziz Said, and Lakshitha S. Prellis, "Conclusion: The Long Road to Reconciliation," in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001).
48. William I. Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 273.
49. Lederach, *Building Peace*; Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*; Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*; Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*.
50. Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld, "Introduction, Theoretical Approach, and Methodology"; Mari Fitzduff, "Changing History—Peace-Building in Northern Ireland," in *People Building Peace*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (The Hague, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 87–103; Mari Fitzduff, "The Challenge to History."
51. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*, 48.
52. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*; and Abu-Nimer et al. "Conclusion: The Long Road to Reconciliation."
53. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*.
54. See Lederach, *Building Peace*.
55. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*; and Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*.
56. John W. McDonald, "The Need for Multi-Track Diplomacy," in *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*, eds. Jon Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

57. McDonald, "The Need for Multi-Track Diplomacy"; Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*.

58. Hussein Agha, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff, *Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*; Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*.

59. Philip Stewart, "The Dartmouth Conference: U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations," in *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*, eds. John W. McDonald and Diane B. Bendahmane (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1987).

60. Herbert C. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinian Case: Past Contributions and Present Challenges," in *Paving the Way*, ed. Ronald J. Fisher (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005); Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*.

61. Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*; Herbert C. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy," in *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*, eds. John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002); Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinian Case"; Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*.

62. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy"; Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinian Case."

63. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinian Case," 47.

64. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy."

65. Lederach, *Building Peace*, 60.

66. Lederach, "Justpeace—The Challenge of the 21st Century," in *People Building Peace*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (The Hague, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention), 27–36.

67. John Davies and Edward Kaufman, *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*, 3–4.

68. Volkan et al., "Official and Unofficial Diplomacy at Work: An Overview," in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work*, eds. Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph V. Montville, and Demetrios A. Julius (Massachusetts/Toronto: Lexington Books, 1991), 1–16; Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*; Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy"; Agha et al., *Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East*; Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*; Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*.

69. See Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War"; and Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict."

70. Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*, 5–6. Also see McDonald, "The Need for Multi-Track Diplomacy"; and Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*.

71. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Nonetheless, it should be noted that track three has been defined differently in the literature with John W. McDonald denoting the third track as private-sector business involvement. See McDonald, "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy," in *Timing and the De-escalation of International Conflicts*, eds. Kriesberg and Thorson (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 201–220.

72. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*; Lederach, *Building Peace*; Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War."

73. Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War."

74. John Paul Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation," in *Turbulent Peace*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 841–854; Lederach, *Building Peace*; Lederach, "Justpeace"; Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War."

75. Lederach, "Civil Society and Reconciliation"; Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War"; Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy*; Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*.

76. de Varennes, "Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflicts"; Lambourne, "Justice and Reconciliation."

77. Kaufman, "Prospects and Problems for Mobilizing Civil Society in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process"; Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict."

78. Rothstein, "In Fear of Peace."

79. Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict"; Halperin, "Introduction," in *To Live Together*, ed. Daniel S. Halperin (Paris, France: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1997), 1–7.

80. Rothstein, "In Fear of Peace."

81. Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict"; Rothstein, "In Fear of Peace"; Dan Shanit, "Letter to the Palestinian Health Organizations," e-mail to IPCRI-News—Views electronic mailing list from pngonet, June 16, 2005.

82. Rothstein, "In Fear of Peace."

83. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*, 50.

84. Gavriel Salomon, "The Nature of Peace Education: Not All Programs Are Created Equal," in *Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices around the World*, eds. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (Mahwah, NJ:

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002); Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

85. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*; and Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*.

86. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 121.

87. Ibid.

88. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*, 50.

89. Ibid., 50.

90. Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War."

91. Cited in Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War," 46.

92. Miles Hewstone and Rupert Brown, "Contact is not Enough: An Intergroup Perspective on the 'Contact Hypothesis,'" in *Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters*, eds. Miles Hewstone and Rupert Brown (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1986), 3–44; Nurit Tal-Or, David Boninger, and Faith Gleicher, "Understanding the Conditions and Processes Necessary for Intergroup Contact to Reduce Prejudice," in *Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices around the World*, eds. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 89–108; Ifat Maoz, "A Decade of Structured Educational Encounters Between Jews and Arabs in Israel," in *To Live Together*, ed. Daniel S. Halperin (Paris, France: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1997), 47–56; Ifat Maoz, "Conceptual Mapping and Evaluation of Peace Education Programs: The Case of Education for Coexistence Through Intergroup Encounters Between Jews and Arabs in Israel," in *Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices around the World*, eds. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 259–269; Mohammed Abu-Nimer, *Dialogue, Conflict Resolution, and Change: Arab Jewish Encounters in Israel* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999); Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "Education for Coexistence in Israel: Potential and Challenges," in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 235–254.

93. S.W. Cook, "Experimenting on Social Issues: The Case of School Desegregation," *American Psychologist* 40/4 (1985): 452–460; Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Intergroup Contact Theory," *Annual Review of Psychology* 49 (1998): 65–85; Hewstone and Brown, "Contact is not Enough."

94. Rachel Ben-Ari and Yehuda Amir, "Intergroup Contact, Cultural Information, and Change in Ethnic Attitudes," in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict*, eds. W. Stroebe, A.W. Kruglanski, D. Bar-Tal, and M. Hewstone (London: Springer-Verlag, 1988), 153.

95. Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict."

96. Gavriel Salomon, "Key Questions Needing Answers: From Confusion to Focus," in *To Live Together*, ed. Daniel S. Halperin (Paris, France: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1997), 134–141; Salomon, "The Nature of Peace Education." It should be noted, however, that there are significant differences between some of the programs. Studying Jewish–Arab encounters in Israel, Maoz relates that the programs fall on a spectrum between traditional, coexistence models (i.e., cultural), and on the other end, confrontational models (see Maoz, "Conceptual Mapping and Evaluation of Peace Education Programs"). She also notes that one of the biggest conflicts is often whether the political reality will even be addressed inside. Maoz deems this "the conflict about the conflict" (see Maoz, "A Decade of Structured Educational Encounters," 52).

97. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*; and Abu-Nimer, "Education for Coexistence in Israel," 252.

98. Abu-Nimer, "Education for Coexistence in Israel," 254.

99. Jamal Al-Shobaki, "The Palestinian Point of View," in *To Live Together*, ed. Daniel S. Halperin (Paris, France: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1997), 17.

100. Gavriel Salomon, "Key Questions Needing Answers," 135.

101. Clark McCauley, "Head First versus Feet First in Peace Education," in *Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and Practices around the World*, eds. Gavriel Salomon and Baruch Nevo (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002); and Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict."

102. Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict."

103. Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict"; Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War"; and Tamar Hermann and David Newman, "A Path Strewn with Thorns: Along the Difficult Road of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking," in *The Management of Peace Processes*, eds. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty. (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press, 2000).

104. Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict."

105. Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 64.

106. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*.

107. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*, 55.

108. Lederach "Justpeace"; and Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*.

109. Lederach, "Justpeace."

110. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*.

111. Salomon, "Key Questions Needing Answers," 135.

112. Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict," 250.

113. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*, 223.

114. Salomon, "Key Questions Needing Answers," 135.

115. David Hulme and Jonathan Goodhand, "NGO's and Peace Building in Complex Political Emergencies: Final Report to the Department for International Development," *Peace Building and Complex Political Emergencies Working Paper Series*, Paper 12 (Manchester, UK: UDPM University of Manchester, 2000), 10.

116. Cited in Ronald J. Fisher, "Introduction: Analyzing Successful Transfer Effects in Interactive Conflict Resolution," in *Paving the Way*, ed. Ronald J. Fisher (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 5.

117. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*; and Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*.

118. Manuel Hassassian, "NGO's in the Context of National Struggle," in *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa*, eds. Benjamin Gidron, Stanley N. Katz, and Yeheskel Hasenfeld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

119. Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1956) 152–153.

120. William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Tensions and Concessions: The Empirical Confirmation of Belief Systems about Soviet Behavior," *Social Problems*, 11/1 (1963), 37–38. For instance, they note that while the U.S. and Great Britain had severe disagreements over the Suez invasion and the Skybolt missile, there has been less tension when compared to disagreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that are "comparable" (*ibid.*, 38).

121. Gamson and Modigliani, "Tensions and Concessions," 39. They define disintegrative forces as "some weighted summation of all the outstanding, recognized disagreements between the countries" and argue that the degree to which the positions are in conflict, and the perceived importance, centrality, and urgency of the issue need to be taken into account (with the recognition that this weighting can change over time) (*ibid.*, 38). While maintaining this definition, I would simply add in cultural, social, and psychological forces.

122. It is important to recognize that increasing integrative ties is *not* the same thing as increasing integration.

123. Gamson and Modigliani, "Tensions and Concessions," 39.

124. Gamson, personal communication, 2005.

125. Louis Kreisberg, "Changing Forms of Coexistence," in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001).

126. Kreisberg, "Changing Forms of Coexistence."

127. The Corrymeela Oasis in Northern Ireland in *People Building Peace*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (The Hague, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention), 1999, 369.

128. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinian Case," 58.

129. For the "re-entry period," see Ryan, "Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict." For "transfer," see Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinian Case."

130. Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War."

131. William A. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, eds. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 67.

132. Cited in Paul Wehr, "Conflict Utility Module II: Social Reality Construction," (handout, Department of Sociology, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1997).

133. Gamson, personal communication, 2003.

134. Herbert C. Kelman, "Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies: A Social-Psychological Approach," in *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, ed. Robert L. Rothstein (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 201.

135. Ronald J. Fisher, "Social-Psychological Processes in Interactive Conflict Analysis and Reconciliation," in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001).

136. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process*, 74.

137. *Ibid.*, 10.

138. Hermann and Newman, "A Path Strewn with Thorns," 143.

139. Gershon Baskin, interview, 2002.

140. Gamson and Modigliani, "Tensions and Concessions," 46.

141. Manuel Hassassian and Edward Kaufman, "Israeli-Palestinian Peace-Building—Lessons Learnt," in *People Building Peace*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (The Hague, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 115.

142. Gamson and Modigliani, "Tensions and Concessions."

143. Louise Diamond, "Multi-Track Diplomacy in the 21st Century," in *People Building Peace*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention (The Hague, The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), 83.

144. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. It should be noted, as pointed out earlier, that the peace studies literature incorporates more of a focus on issues of structure, power, asymmetry, and justice. Nonetheless, it too, arguably suffers from not being placed within a larger analysis of global forces of oppression (see note 13).

145. Shanit, "Letter to the Palestinian Health Organizations," E-mail to IPCRI-News—Views electronic mailing list from pngonet, June 16, 2005.

146. At the risk of saying the obvious, it should be noted that this is *not* the only school of thought amongst “minority” groups or conflict groups with less power. For instance, M. Hassassian (interview, 2000) notes that in the Palestinian community there are two different schools of thought. The first and more official perspective which I have highlighted is that normalization (often perceived as including people-to-people initiatives and peace education) cannot be established until the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are complete. The second school of thought states that dialogue is needed to help facilitate a culture of peace, which could aid the peacemaking process. In fact, with regards to the latter, it has also been argued that encounters can also lead to the empowerment of members of such groups (see Abu-Nimer, *Dialogue, Conflict Resolution, and Change*), which in turn could lead to more demands for justice (see Ryan, “Transforming Violent Intercommunal Conflict”).

147. Nadia Nasser-Najjab, “The Palestinian Peace Information Centre,” in *To Live Together*, ed. Daniel S. Halperin (Paris, France: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1997), 43–46; and Palestinian Health Organizations, “An Open Letter to the Palestinian and International Community Regarding Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation in Health, June 2005,” E-mail to IPCRI-News—Views electronic mailing list from pngonet, June 13, 2005.

148. Nasser-Najjab, “The Palestinian Peace Information Centre.”

149. Robert Inglehart, “Controversy: Value Change in Industrial Society,” *American Political Science Review* 81/4 (1987): 1289–1303.

150. Palestinian Health Organizations, “An Open Letter to the Palestinian and International Community.”

151. Rothstein, “In Fear of Peace,” 202.

152. Palestinian Health Organizations, “Response to Shanit,” E-mail to IPCRI-News—Views electronic mailing list from pngonet, July 6, 2005.

153. Palestinian Health Organizations, “An Open Letter to the Palestinian and International Community.”

154. Louis Kriesberg, “Changing Forms of Coexistence,” in *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001).

155. *Ibid.*, 61.

156. Muhammad Dajani, “Final Status of the Peace Process” (presentation, The Peace Process in the Middle East Conference, Haifa University, Israel, March 13, 2000).

157. Gamson and Modigliani, “Tensions and Concessions.”

158. Lederach, “Justpeace.”

159. Hassassian and Kaufman, “Israeli-Palestinian Peace-Building—Lessons Learnt.”

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165. William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 7.

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169. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "Education for Coexistence in Israel," 247.

170. Palestinian Health Organizations, "An Open Letter to the Palestinian and International Community."

171. Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*; Lederach, *Building Peace*.

172. Hassassian and Kaufman, "Israeli-Palestinian Peace-Building—Lessons Learnt."

173. Orjuela, "Civil Society in Civil War," 65.

174. Hassassian and Kaufman, "Israeli-Palestinian Peace-Building—Lessons Learnt," 121. With regards to using the media, strategies designed by Charlotte Ryan could be helpful in creating a viable media strategy for these people-to-people activities. See Ryan, *Prime Time Activism* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1991).

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177. Abu-Nimer, "Education for Coexistence in Israel," 252.
178. Hubbard, "Understanding Majority and Minority Participation in Interracial and Interethnic Dialogue."
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180. See Miall et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. In the case of Israel-Palestine, Hassassian and Kaufman in "Israeli-Palestinian Peace-Building—Lessons Learnt" offer some excellent recommendations. See also Michelle I. Gawerc, "Peace Education: Israelis and Palestinians — The Development of Peace-Building with Social Justice for the Future," posted on Israeli-Palestinian Peace Education Network, 2000.
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